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Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: 




It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less 
incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases 
their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test 
focusing on a particular kind of crime, namely corruption. In order to test it, it was necessary 
to create an indicator measuring de jure as well as de facto independence of the prosecution 
agencies. The regressions show that de facto independence of prosecution agencies robustly 
reduces corruption of officials. 
JEL Code: H11, K40, K42. 
Keywords: corruption, prosecution agencies, judicial independence and positive constitutional 
economics. 
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Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using 
a New Set of Indicators 
1 Introduction 
Over the last ten years, both the consequences and the causes of corruption have 
been important research topics. Mauro (1995) was one of the first to show that 
corruption is detrimental to investment and growth. If that is the case, identifying 
the causes of perceived corruption becomes an issue. Here, Treisman (2000) is the 
seminal paper showing that high income levels are the best predictor for the ab-
sence of perceived corruption. Other determinants for the absence of perceived 
corruption include historic variables (British rule, number of years of having been 
democratic), cultural variables (being protestant), but also institutional variables 
(not having a federal structure). 
To date, the structure of judicial institutions as a potential determinant of corrup-
tion has received no attention. Yet, it seems likely that the structure of the judici-
ary plays an important role in determining corruption levels. This paper asks 
whether the organizational structure of prosecuting authorities affects corruption 
levels. It is based on a simple hypothesis: if prosecutors are subject to the direc-
tives of government members, then these government members could misuse this 
power to prevent the prosecution of crimes committed by people like themselves. 
This makes crimes – including corruption – more attractive and, hence, more 
likely. If prosecutors are, alternatively, independent from directives of govern-
ment, then corruption levels are predicted to be lower. 
In order to test this hypothesis, measures on the independence of prosecutors are 
needed. The first value-added of this paper is the construction of two such indica-
tors: one capturing their formal independence (de jure PI) and another one captur-
ing their factual independence (de facto PI). The de jure indicator summarizes up 
to 21 variables, the de facto indicator up to 7. 
The indicator for de jure and de facto PI is available for 78 and 76 countries re-
spectively. De facto PI turns out to be highly and robustly significant for explain-
ing variation in perceived corruption: the more independent the prosecutors factu-
ally are, the lower the expected level of corruption, c.p.. De jure PI has an unex-
pected sign: more independence is correlated with more corruption. But this vari-
able never reaches conventional significance levels. We argue that the unexpected 
sign is the result of reversed causality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, our key 
terms are defined and some theoretical hypotheses developed. Section 3 presents – 3 – 
the new indicator on the various aspects of prosecutorial independence. Our esti-
mation approach and a description of the additionally used variables are presented 
in section 4. Our estimation results can be found in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Some Theory 
Before developing our hypotheses, we start with some central definitions: Corrup-
tion is defined as the misuse of public office for private benefit. Private benefit 
need not be confined to individual benefit but can include benefits to political par-
ties and other associations. 
The office of the public prosecutor takes on different names in different countries, 
e.g. Crown Prosecution Service, Public Attorney's Office, Department of Public 
Prosecution, Public Prosecution Authority, Attorney General Office, State Attor-
ney Office etc. For simplicity, the generic term “procuracy” is used to include all 
of these. If one thinks in terms of a value chain, the procuracy can be separated 
from the police, which is part of the executive, on the one hand, and from the ju-
diciary, on the other. The following criteria should all be fulfilled in order to qual-
ify as a procuracy: (i) it has the competence to gather information on the behavior 
of criminal suspects, or to instruct the police to gather more information; (ii) on 
the basis of that information, it has the competence to indict a suspect; (iii) during 
a trial it represents the interests of the public.1 
The likelihood of a government member becoming corrupt depends on the ex-
pected utility of corruption. A higher likelihood of corrupt behavior being prose-
cuted is expected to be correlated with lower levels of corruption, c.p.. There is, 
hence, a close interdependence between the behavior of government members and 
the behavior of members of the procuracy. We assume that prosecutors maximize 
the same that everybody else does2 and that their incentives are shaped by the in-
                                                 
1   Empirically, investigative committees that are part of the legislature often inquire into execu-
tive crimes during the course of duties. Their competences differ widely. In this paper, we re-
frain from considering them because they are not part of the permanently established prose-
cution agency. Their action depends on discretionary acts of parliament. Additionally, their 
focus is often restricted to crimes committed during the course of office or even more nar-
rowly to breach of duty of office, whereas our focus is, as just spelled out, broader. 
2   Posner (1994) asks: “What Do Judges Maximize?” and answers: “The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does”. We extend this assumption to prosecutors. Glaeser et al. (2000) explicitly ask: 
“What Do Prosecutors Maximize?” They are specifically interested in the US setting in 
which concurrent competences between state and federal prosecutors play an important role. – 4 – 
stitutions structuring the procuracy as well as the relationship of the procuracy and 
other government offices. Prosecutors can be subject to directives by government 
members because competences are formally allocated to them. In this case, formal 
independence of prosecutors would be low. But prosecutors can also be subject to 
directives by government members because government members put pressure on 
prosecutors although formal institutions do not allocate such competence to them. 
In this case, factual independence of prosecutors would be low. 
We argue that factual independence is crucial for how prosecutors behave. PI im-
plies that prosecutors do not have to anticipate negative consequences as the result 
of their behavior such as (a) being expelled, (b) being removed against their will 
to another position or location or (c) being paid less. The factual independence of 
prosecutors from members of government is a necessary condition of prosecutors 
prosecuting crimes committed by members of government. Yet, it is not a suffi-
cient condition. Independence from other government branches can also be mis-
used: prosecutors could, e.g., turn lazy or prosecute primarily those whom they 
dislike. Such misuse of independence can possibly be curbed by leaving prosecu-
tors only little discretion. Inactivity might also be curbed by giving third parties 
the competence to initiate proceedings against suspects. These additional aspects 
are also reflected in the indicator to be presented in the next section.3 
The expected utility of corrupt behavior does not only depend on the (factual) in-
dependence of prosecutors, but also on the (factual) independence of judges. If 
judges are not independent from government, then corruption cases might be 
brought to court by prosecutors but not be sanctioned by judges. This means that 
an independent procuracy is primarily expected to have beneficial effects if the 
judges are also independent from government interference. This argument can 
also be turned around: in many countries, the procuracy acts as a gate-keeper to 
the courts. Judges cannot initiate proceedings but often depend entirely on prose-
cutors to bring a case before they can become active. This means that – at least 
with regard to criminal cases – an independent judiciary can only be expected to 
have any beneficial effects if the procuracy is also independent from government 
interference.  
                                                                                                                                      
Additionally, the direct election of many prosecutors in the U.S. has a major impact on their 
behavior. In a sense, the US setting is unique.  
3   There might be “too much” prosecutorial independence. Empirically, this could be tested by 
regressing corruption also on the quadratic term of the PI. – 5 – 
In cross country settings, omitted variable bias always looms large. This is why 
there are a number of potentially significant control variables. It could be argued 
that the likelihood of corrupt behavior being prosecuted depends on the degree of 
political competition observed in a country. Suppose one party has been control-
ling all important offices for many years and contrast that with another country in 
which representatives of various partners hold important positions all the time. It 
appears plausible to assume that government corruption is lower in the second 
country. This will be controlled for by taking the realized level of checks and bal-
ances explicitly into account. 
The last argument assumed that opposition interested in prosecuting corruption 
could reduce the likelihood of corrupt behavior. A press enjoying a high degree of 
freedom can also substantially reduce the expected utility from corrupt acts – and, 
hence, make them less likely. It is possible that a free press can re-enforce some 
of the effects already discussed. It appears worthwhile to estimate interaction ef-
fects. 
Fighting corruption has been high on the development agenda for a number of 
years. Some states have even founded specific agencies that have the sole task of 
combating corruption. It could be that such agencies increase the likelihood of 
corrupt behavior being prosecuted which could, in turn, reduce the coefficient of 
the PI-indicator variable.4 
3 A New Indicator on Prosecutorial Independence 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
In this section of the paper, we introduce two new indicators. They have been 
constructed relying exclusively on verifiable information – and not on subjective 
evaluations of any country experts. Anybody interested in recalculating the indi-
cators should, at least in principle, arrive at identical values. They consist of up to 
28 variables and we present them in various groups that can be kept apart in order 
to test for the specific influences of specific aspects of prosecutorial independ-
ence. The most important separation is that between de jure PI and de facto PI. 
The variables that make up de jure PI can all be found in legal documents whereas 
de facto PI is concerned with their factual implementation. Within de jure PI, five 
                                                 
4   But it could also be that anti-corruption agencies and corruption are positively correlated if 
such agencies are founded because a society seriously suffers from problems with corruption. 
We might, hence, deal with a problem of reversed causality. – 6 – 
aspects are elaborated upon separately. These are (1) general institutional traits 
(such as whether the prosecution agency is mentioned in the Constitution, what 
the formal qualifications are that one needs to have in order to become a prosecu-
tor etc.), (2) the personal independence of prosecutors (including appointment, 
promotion, transfer and removal from office), (3) the formal independence from 
government (right of government members to give positive/negative instructions 
to prosecutors), (4) the issue whether the procuracy enjoys a monopoly in initiat-
ing prosecutions or whether there are alternative ways to get prosecutions started 
and (5) the degree of discretion that prosecutors enjoy in pursuing their cases. 
Each of the variables used can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater val-
ues indicate a higher degree of PI. There are various ways to aggregate the single 
variables into an overall indicator: the first option is to sum up all codings for all 
available variables and then divide by the number of variables for which informa-
tion is available. We call this the unweighted de jure indicator. Alternatively, the 
five sub-indicators just mentioned could be summed and then normalized. This 
implies a weighting of the variables, since the variables contained in sub-
indicators with a low number of variables are weighted relatively more heavily 
than those contained in sub-indicators with a high number of variables. In the re-
gressions we always use the unweighted indicator.  
Information was enquired by country experts via a questionnaire that was e-
mailed to them. For filling in the questionnaire, the country experts did not have 
to make personal evaluations of the situation in their country, but were asked to 
simply give information on the legal structure of the procuracy. Among the coun-
try experts were Supreme Court judges, law professors, lawyers but also activists 
from organizations such as Transparency International. Mails were sent to far 
more than 78 experts – the number of countries for which data are available – but 
many recipients never answered or promised to fill in the questionnaire later. The 
choice of countries could be called ‘biased random’ due to a number of factors: 
contacts to legal experts are not equally spread around the world; the use of e-mail 
is also not equally distributed around the world. But cultural factors might also 
play in. The Middle and Far East as well as Africa are clearly underrepresented in 
our study. Notice that the codings were NOT contained in the questionnaire sent 
to the country experts. 
For quite a number of countries, 2 or even more questionnaires were received. 
The degree to which the answers coincided was quite high. In case different an-
swers were given, it was attempted to do some fact-finding based on the informa-
tion given by the experts. Rarely, the coding was done solely on the basis of the 
more plausible answer, i.e. on its coherence with the other answers provided etc. – 7 – 
3.2 The de jure Components 
3.2.1 General Institutional Traits of the Procuracy 
It was asked whether the office of state prosecutor is mentioned in the Constitu-
tion of the country based on the hypothesis that an explicit mentioning in the Con-
stitution can be interpreted as a signal that the founders of the Constitution be-
lieved the procuracy to be an important part of the political process [1; the num-
bers in brackets in the following two subsections refer to the numbers in the ques-
tionnaire that is reprinted as appendix 1]. In order to further ascertain the rele-
vance that the legal order attributes to prosecutors, it was asked whether their 
formal qualification requirements are as demanding as that of judges – or less 
[14]. Closely related is the difficulty of removing prosecutors from office. Again, 
this was compared to the difficulty of removing judges from their office [28]. A 
last aspect of the general institutional set-up is whether incoming cases are allo-
cated to specific prosecutors by a general rule. Such a rule reduces discretionary 
powers of members of the executive and/or the head of the procuracy [8]. The 
subindicator based on these four variables is called “general”. 
3.2.2 Personal Independence of Prosecutors 
The personal independence of prosecutors can be the result of various institutional 
arrangements concerning the nomination, election and appointment procedures of 
prosecutors as well as promotion and removal from office. We distinguish be-
tween high-level prosecutors, such as the state prosecutor, or general prosecutor / 
attorney general, and other prosecutors as appointment/election procedures may 
differ substantially between the low-level prosecutors and the high level ones. The 
appointment of high-level prosecutors is assumed to be decisive as they usually 
have an internal right of instruction.5 
Appointment 
In determining the personal independence of the procuracy from the executive and 
the legislature, three aspects are considered, namely (i) term length [19], (ii) re-
newability [19], and (iii) appointing organ [18]. Life tenure and appointment by 
                                                 
5   Appointment of low-level prosecutors is usually done by the high level prosecutor or the 
minister of justice. The decision is usually based on merits or grades. Due to the hierarchical 
structure of the procuracy, the appointment of low-level prosecutors is of little influence for 
the probability of crimes committed by government members to be prosecuted, which al-
lows us to neglect this point. – 8 – 
others than politicians guarantees the greatest personal independence, while ap-
pointment by politicians for a renewable term generates the lowest independence, 
as it can be expected to motivate prosecutors to cater to the interests of the organ 
that has the power to re-elect them. Appointment for a non-renewable fixed term 
generates more personal independence than appointment for a renewable term. 
Promotion/Transfer of Prosecutors /Removal from Office 
The behavior of prosecutors towards members of the executive is influenced by 
the degree to which members of the executive determine a prosecutor’s career. 
Relevant aspects include (i) promotion [23], (ii) removal from office [24, 25], and 
(iii) transfer [26]. 
(i) Even if prosecutors enjoy tenure, a promotion procedure monopolized by poli-
ticians can decrease personal independence. Hence, if representatives of the public 
prosecutors participate in this process, political influence via the promotion proc-
ess is expected to be lower than in countries where (representatives of) prosecu-
tors are not asked. Self-governing bodies of the procuracy, which can decide on 
promotions are supposed to lead to the highest degree of independence. 
(ii) The same argument applies to removal from office. If prosecutors may be re-
moved at will by the executive, the incentive to resist political pressure is reduced. 
(iii) Transfers to other offices (including in other cities) might be a device for 
heavy pressure if they can be carried out against the will of the prosecutor. This is 
the reason why the principle of non-transferal against the will is often named as 
part of the concept of judicial independence. Application of this principle to the 
procuracy will make it less dependent on others. 
The sub-indicator based on these seven variables is called “personal narrow”. This 
implies that there is also another sub-indicator called “personal broad” which is, 
indeed, the case. In addition to the seven variables of “personal narrow”, it takes 
into consideration whether low level prosecutors and criminal law judges enjoy 
tenure [20, 21]. 
3.2.3 Formal Independence of Prosecutors 
Prosecutors may be subjected to orders regarding individual cases they handle. 
We propose to distinguish between instructions given by superiors within the 
prosecution agency (internal orders [7]) and instructions given by officials outside 
the procuracy, e.g., by the minister of justice (external orders [6]). The absence of 
external instructions is assumed to be more important for the probability of crimes – 9 – 
committed by government members being prosecuted than the possibility of the 
head of the procuracy to give orders to low level prosecutors because it allocates 
ultimate decision-making with regard to the prosecution of such crimes to the ex-
ecutive. If no external instructions may be given, prosecutors are called formally 
independent. 
The Power to Substitute a Prosecutor in Handling a Specific Case 
A functional equivalent of the right to give orders is the right to substitute prose-
cutors working on a specific case [9, 10]. This is functionally equivalent because 
it endows the hierarchical superior giving orders to have his line of prosecution 
carried out (or else having the case taken away). The combination of the power to 
give external orders to the high prosecutor and his or her authority to give internal 
instructions or to substitute the prosecutor working on the case, amounts to a 
rather direct way of influencing the investigation. Nevertheless, substituting the 
prosecutor might attract more public attention and criticism than instructions 
given in camera to the prosecutor handling an investigation. The sub-indicator 
based on these four variables is called “formal”. 
3.2.4 Monopoly in Prosecution? 
If the procuracy enjoys a monopoly to prosecute crimes, economists would expect 
a lower total number of prosecutions compared to institutional arrangements in 
which prosecutorial activities are not confined to the procuracy. Such a monopoly, 
even when politicians cannot formally instruct or interfere with the prosecutor’s 
decision, provides incentives for politicians who are at risk of being prosecuted to 
influence the procuracy by, for example, intervening in their appointment process 
or offering bribes. If other actors can also initiate a trial, it will be more difficult to 
prevent being prosecuted through such means. 
There are various possibilities to institutionalize competition in prosecution: the 
competence to indict can also be given to the police, to interested private parties, 
e.g. the victim (or her family) who might have the right to force public prosecu-
tion or to initiate proceedings independently, or to certain interest groups, such as 
child protection groups, environmental groups, or taxpayer associations. The latter 
avenue might be more effective in combating corruption, since many corruption 
cases are so-called victimless crimes in which there is no individual victim; the 
victim is the public at large. Taking a case to court thus amounts to the production 
of a public good. Interest groups can be assumed to be more likely to contribute to 
its production than individuals [4]. – 10 – 
Opening up additional channels for prosecution can also be interpreted as increas-
ing the accountability of prosecutors as they will have to justify why it was not 
them who initiated proceedings. Another means of making the procuracy account-
able can be to make its decisions subject to judicial review [13]. If actors can 
force the procuracy to become active via a judicial decision, this increases the in-
centives of the procuracy to prosecute cases. The sub-indicator based on these two 
variables is called “monopoly”. 
3.2.5 Degree of Discretion in Prosecution 
The existence of discretion in individual decisions regarding prosecution is likely 
to have an impact on the chances of public figures being prosecuted [2, 3]. The 
degree of discretion is influenced by the adoption of the mandatory principle, but 
also by “hidden” components of discretion, such as the ability to drop a case due 
to insufficient evidence or not concentrating enough efforts to conduct serious in-
vestigations. 
The legality principle – sometimes also called the principle of mandatory prosecu-
tion – commands that every case in which there is enough evidence of an offence 
having been committed has to be brought to court. The opportunity principle, in 
contrast, grants a prosecutor some discretion concerning the indictment decision 
given the same amount of evidence. The opportunity principle confers more dis-
cretion to the procuracy than the legality principle, as it allows broader justifica-
tions for non-prosecution of cases.6 Other things being equal, the prosecution of 
crimes committed by government members is expected to be higher under the 
mandatory principle than under the opportunity principle. The sub-indicator con-
structed on the basis of these variables is called “discretion”. 
3.3 De facto Prosecutorial Independence 
We now turn to possible ways of measuring PI as factually implemented. As with 
regard to the de jure indicator, no one single proxy adequately reflects all relevant 
aspects of PI. To assess de facto PI, up to seven variables have been used. Again, 
each of these variables can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater values 
indicate a higher degree of JI. 
                                                 
6   Although this conceptual distinction is watertight, empirically one can observe that prosecu-
tors almost anywhere enjoy some degree of explicit discretion in their decision to indict (or 
not to indict). In most legal systems, charges can be dismissed by the prosecutor on the basis 
of policy considerations. Lack of public interest in prosecution is a prominent example. – 11 – 
The  de jure indicator is based on various legal documents. Even if they are 
changed frequently, exact values can be calculated for every single point in time, 
depending on the formal validity of the respective documents. This does not hold 
for de facto PI. Counting the number of times that prosecutors have been removed 
against their will makes only sense if a minimum period is taken into account (for 
this variable, the decade from 1991 to 2000 was chosen). For others, such as the 
development of the real income of prosecutors, an even longer period (between 
1960 and 2000) was chosen. This means, of course, that the indicator will be very 
sticky in comparison to the de jure indicator. We chose this approach because we 
think the past matters for how PI is evaluated by citizens and other potentially 
relevant actors such as investors. Government will not be able to build up a repu-
tation as law-abiding or PI-respecting overnight. Here is a list of the six variables 
and the reasoning used for coding them: 
(1-2) If prosecutors are forced to retire against their will or are removed from of-
fice against their will [22, 27], this can be interpreted as a sign that their factual 
independence is low. The more frequently such forced changes occurred, the 
lower the score a country received. 
(3) Frequent changes in the legal foundations concerning the prosecution of 
crimes committed by members of government [29] can be caused by attempts of 
other government branches to increase their influence over the procuracy. Fre-
quent changes increase uncertainty among the members of the procuracy. The 
more changes occurred, the lower the score a country received. 
(4-5) In order to be factually independent, prosecutors need to be paid adequately. 
Additionally, in order to do a good job, the budget of the procuracy needs to be 
adequate. A very conservative criterion was used in order to ascertain these two 
aspects empirically, namely whether the income of prosecutors had remained at 
least constant in real terms since 1960 [30] and whether the budget of the prosecu-
torial offices had remained at least constant since 1960 [31]. 
(6) The last variable focuses on a different aspect – and offers additional informa-
tion rather than belonging to the core of prosecutorial independence. It was also 
asked how many cases are initiated by actors other than the state prosecutors. The 
interpretation of this number is, however, debatable: on the one hand, one could 
argue that a high number indicates that the prosecutorial process is not monopo-
lized by the procuracy. They do not prevent cases from being taken to the court. 
In that interpretation, a high number of cases should thus indicate not a high fac-
tual degree of PI, but a high chance of criminal cases being prosecuted. On the 
other hand, one could argue that a high number of cases being prosecuted by oth-– 12 – 
ers is a signal that the threat potential of others initiating prosecutions is not suffi-
cient in order to induce the prosecutors to do their work. The second interpretation 
presupposes an ideal in which close to all cases should be prosecuted by the pro-
curacy. But there can be legal systems that do not share that ideal. We just opt in 
favor of the first interpretation, in which a high number of cases initiated by oth-
ers than state prosecutors is taken as a positive sign for the likelihood of criminal 
cases being taken to court. 
(7) It can be argued that the factual independence of prosecutors also depends on 
the number of politically motivated assassinations counted in a country. If prose-
cutors fear they could be the object of an assassination attempt, this might make 
them less tough in prosecuting government members if they suspect government 
behind some of the assassinations. The number of assassinations was not an item 
in the questionnaire. Instead, the figures contained in Bank’s Cross-National 
Time-Series Data Archive (2004) and defined as “Any politically motivated mur-
der or attempted murder of a high government official or politician”. The numbers 
for the years 1999 to 2003 were summed up and then normalized by population 
size and coded such that more assassinations lead to lower scores (Lebanon scored 
.17, Trinidad and Tobago .18, Armenia 0.19 and Colombia .26. Then there is a 
huge gap with Bolivia being ranked fifth but scoring .70).7 
A systematic stock-taking of the various prosecutorial systems realized in the 
world has never taken place.8 Since the focus of our analysis is on the impact of 
PI on corruption, we can only address the data on PI briefly. It is most interesting 
to note that de jure and de facto PI deviate strongly from each other. While, for 
example, Argentina (rank 1), Armenia (rank 2) and Latvia (rank 3) occupy the top 
positions in the de jure indicator, England (rank 51), Switzerland (rank 62), Ger-
many (rank 64), the U.S. (rank 68), Australia (rank 69), France (rank 70) and 
Denmark (rank 76) fare relatively badly. This picture turns in the case of de facto 
PI with Argentina (rank 69), Armenia (rank 54) and Latvia (rank 45) not occupy-
ing top places anymore. Here, the highly developed countries fare a lot better with 
                                                 
7   It proved to be more difficult to receive information on de facto than on de jure variables. We 
decided to include countries into the ranking even if information on only two variables was 
available. To check the robustness of results, regressions were rerun increasing the minimum 
number of available variables one by one (which meant reducing the number of observa-
tions). Results remained, however, virtually unchanged. 
8   This is even true for the legal science. Dressler (2002) has edited an Encyclopedia of Crime 
and Justice which does, however, not contain a systematic comparison of the various sys-
tems. – 13 – 
France (rank 1), Australia (rank 8), Denmark (rank 14), Switzerland (rank 17), 
England and the U.S. (jointly on rank 18) and Germany (rank 28). Indeed, the cor-
relation coefficient between de jure and de facto PI is -0.214 and thus negative.9 
Given the negative correlation, the question emerges what mechanisms are at 
work transforming de jure into de facto PI, a question which is, however, beyond 
the scope of this paper. Yet, this surprising finding will be shortly discussed in the 
next section. 
4 The Estimation Approach  
A canonical model to explain corruption could be obtained neither from a theo-
retical inquiry (see Aidt 2003) nor from empirical analyses (see Seldadyo and De 
Haan 2005, Serra 2006). Seldadyo and De Haan (2005) and Serra (2006) conduct 
extreme bounds analyses to identify those determinants of corruption that had 
been found to have an impact on corruption in previous empirical studies and that 
remain robust performing an extreme bounds analysis. Although their analysis 
provides some hints as to the robustness of different factors, no parsimonious 
clear-cut baseline specification follows from their inquiry. In order to test the im-
pact of PI on corruption, we thus estimate the following model: 
       CPIi = α + βMi + γPIi + δJIi + εZi + ui    ( 1 )  
where the dependent variable CPI, stands for the average Corruption Perceptions 
Index for the years 1998 to 2006. The CPI ranks countries by their perceived lev-
els of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys. The 
index is constructed on the basis of surveys from up to 13 independent organiza-
tions carried out among resident and non-resident country experts with a focus on 
corruption in the public and political sectors. The index can take on values be-
tween 0 (very high corruption levels) and 10 (corruption free). We have multi-
plied the index by (-1) in order to make the regression results more easily accessi-
ble. A positive sign of an estimated coefficient then indicates that the respective 
variables is associated with higher corruption levels and vice versa. 
The explanatory variables are: 
                                                 
9   In a study based on a very similar research design, Feld and Voigt (2003) found that the par-
tial correlation between de jure and de facto judicial independence was only .167. The correla-
tion coefficient between de facto PI and de facto JI amounts to 0.331, and that between de jure PI 
and de jure JI to 0.111. – 14 – 
M  a vector of variables that proved significant in explaining corrup-
tion in previous studies. Following Treisman (2000) and Seldadyo 
and De Haan (2005), our M-vector contains (i) per capita income in 
1990; (ii) trade openness as the sum of a country’s exports and im-
ports in percent of GDP, (iii) population size, (iv) the percentage of 
the population that declares to be protestant and (v) a dummy for 
former British colonies; 
PI  a vector containing both de jure and de facto PI; 
JI  a vector of the de jure and de facto index of judicial independence 
as introduced by Feld and Voigt (2003), 
Z  a vector of additional controls; these are mostly institutional or po-
litical; 
u a  stochastic  term. 
Exact definitions and sources of all variables can be found in the appendix. The 
estimation strategy consists in running a baseline regression based on the M-
vector, then establishing a basic impact of PI on corruption and finally extending 
the models further by running several robustness checks. 
5 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the baseline specifications are presented in Table 1. As 
the results show, the models perform relatively well. Without reporting the indi-
vidual results we have also tested the null hypothesis of normal distribution of the 
residuals which cannot be rejected in any of the regressions. Thus, there are no 
outliers which we need to take care of. In particular, there is no need to particu-
larly focus on the U.S. as our footnote 2 might imply. The first equation reveals 
that the M-vector can already account for more than 80% of the variation in per-
ceived corruption levels. Countries with high per capita income that used to be a 
British colony and whose population is protestant are likely to suffer from low 
levels of corruption only. While openness and population size have signs already 
found in other investigations these variables do not turn out to be significant on 
any conventional significance level. Equations (2) through (5) serve to introduce 
various combinations of the PI and the JI vectors. Surprisingly, the index of de 
jure prosecutorial independence has a positive sign implying that higher levels of – 15 – 
de jure PI are correlated with higher levels of perceived corruption. This variable 
never reaches conventional levels of significance though.10 
 
Table 1:  OLS-Regressions  of  the  Average Corruption Perception Index 
(Inverse) between 1998 and 2006 on Prosecutorial Independence and Con-
trols, Baseline Specifications 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












Dejiure  JI  – – – –  0.539 
(0.64) 
De facto  JI  – – – –  -1.252* 
(2.49) 
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Constant  -1.408 -1.738 -1.292 -1.581 -1.314 
2 R   0.851 0.853 0.861 0.862 0.882 
RMSE  0.933 0.936 0.917 0.922 0.919 
Observations  75 75 73 73 59 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics. 
‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from 
zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the 
regression.  
 
De facto PI has the expected negative impact on corruption. In equation (3), it is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Including both de jure and de facto PI confirms 
the results from the two previous equations: de jure PI has an insignificant posi-
tive effect and de facto PI reduces corruption significantly. Equation (5) reveals, 
                                                 
10   This is also true when alternative specifications of the de jure indicator are used (regression 
results based on  the weighted de jure index are virtually identical). – 16 – 
first, that these effects are robust to the inclusion of both de jure and de facto indi-
cators of judicial independence although de facto PI loses some statistical signifi-
cance but is still significant on the 5 percent level. Second, none of the de jure 
variables is significant whereas both de facto variables are significant on the 5 
percent level. Third, de facto JI significantly reduces corruption as well.11 
The finding that de jure and de facto PI have opposite effects on perceived corrup-
tion levels is puzzling at first. Econometrically, it seems desirable to instrument 
PI. Yet, adequate instruments are hard to find. Before discussing pros and cons of 
possible instruments, we propose a simple argument: Both the causes and conse-
quences of corruption have been high on the development agenda for the last 10 
or 15 years. Some development aid is conditional on improvement in governance 
scores including corruption. It thus appears very plausible that high levels of cor-
ruption are a cause for major reforms, including criminal procedural law. Causal-
ity is, hence, reversed. This does, however, only hold for de jure PI as factual in-
dependence is not determined by well-intentioned declarations (i.e. fresh legisla-
tion) but by the factual behavior of government representatives over a long period. 
Our data support that view: the average value of de jure PI for the entire sample is 
.470. If a sub-sample containing only those countries that passed major revisions 
of their criminal procedural law in 1990 or later is constructed (N=27), this aver-
age rises to 0.5288. If, conversely, another sub-sample is constructed (N=43) in 
which no such reforms took place, the average is 0.4162. This is exactly what one 
would expect following our argument: recently passed legislation allocates a 
higher level of formal independence to the prosecutors than old legislation. It is 
also in line with our argument that this is turned around when the averages for de 
facto PI are calculated: whereas the average for the entire sample is 0.526, the 
more recent legislators only achieve 0.4227, whereas the more established coun-
tries secure 0.5893. As the estimated effect of de jure PI is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero and the regression results obtained remain robust to the exclusion 
of de jure PI, we do not undertake the endeavor to find valid instruments. 
                                                 
11   The reader should not worry that the different estimated equations in Tables 1 to 3 are based 
on different numbers of observations. We have estimated all equations by restricting the 
number of observations to the following ones with less observations. E.g. in Table 1 this 
means that we have estimated equations (1) and (2) also with the same observations as equa-
tions (3) and (4), and equation (4) with the same observations as equation (5). The results did 
virtually not respond to the reduction in observations implying that it is the specification and 
not the reduced sample size that leads to changes in estimation results as compared to previ-
ous equations.  – 17 – 
Table 2 reports the results from further robustness checks. The main message is 
that de facto PI always remains significant for explaining variation in corruption 
perception levels. De jure PI keeps its unexpected positive sign but never reaches 
conventional significance levels. In most equations in both table 1 and table 2, the 
 
Table  2:    OLS-Regressions of the Average Corruption Perception Index (In-
verse) between 1998 and 2006 on Prosecutorial Independence and Controls, 
Robustness Analysis 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 




















Polity IV  -0.033 
(1.10) 
– – –  0.019 
(0.56) 
Checks 1995  –  0.155 
(1.54) 
– –  0.160(*)
(1.70) 


































































Constant  -1.712  -2.009 -1.574 -3.390 -4.238 
2 R   0.865  0.867 0.869 0.878 0.895 
RMSE  0.920  0.913 0.904 0.873 0.829 
Observations 73  73  73  73  73 
For notes see Table 1. 
 
point estimate of de facto PI is between 0.6 and 0.9. We interpret this as meaning 
that a country that switched from a completely dependent procuracy to a com-
pletely independent one would, c.p., improve its CPI level between 0.6 and 0.9. It 
would enable a country to switch from the level of the Czech Republic (4.28) to – 18 – 
that of Hungary (5.04) or from that of Malaysia (5.16) to Estonia (5.88) or Slove-
nia (5.89). 
A high level of democracy (reflected in a high Polity IV score) is correlated with 
less corruption, but without becoming significant. We further conjectured that a 
higher level of factually realized checks and balances would decrease corruption. 
This is not the case; the coefficient is even positive and sometimes even margin-
ally significant. Equation (3) in Table 2 contains a dummy variable for Anti-
Corruption Agencies. Countries that have such agencies do suffer from higher 
levels of corruption. This suggests that causality might be reversed here: because 
corruption is high – and perceived as a problem – an anti-corruption agency is 
founded. Equation (4) shows that a high degree of press freedom is correlated 
with significantly lower levels of corruption (notice that we have also recalculated 
the original variable by multiplication with (-1)). Finally, estimating the full 
model in equation (5) with all variables used for robustness checks indicates that 
de facto PI remains significantly negative while press freedom also restricts cor-
ruption significantly. 
The regression results presented in Table 3 show the effect of an interaction be-
tween de facto PI and freedom of the press. The first column in Table 3 simply 
replicates equation (5) of Table 2. This should serve as a benchmark for evaluat-
ing the interaction effects. Interacting de facto PI and freedom of the press in 
equation (2) leads to almost a tripling of the de facto PI coefficient. The interac-
tion term is significantly different from zero and has a negative impact on corrup-
tion. Freedom of the press also has a negative sign, but is not significant anymore. 
This indicates that freedom of the press reinforces the restrictive impact of de 
facto PI on corruption. An F-Test on joint significance of de facto PI or of free-
dom of the press corroborates the results of equation (4) in Table 2. When the ad-
ditional institutional and political control variables of equation (1) in Table 3 are 
included in the regression (equation (3)), the interaction term is not significant 
anymore. But the tests on joint significance indicate that freedom of the press and 
de facto PI keep their significant effects on corruption. As the interaction term is 
marginally significant, we can tentatively conclude that the reinforcing effect is 
 – 19 – 
Table  3:    OLS-Regressions of the Average Corruption Perception Index (In-
verse) between 1998 and 2006 on Prosecutorial Independence and Controls, 
Robustness Analysis 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
































































































































Constant  -4.238  -3.010 -3.897 -3.500 -3.294 
2 R   0.895  0.883 0.898 0.908 0.912 
SER  0.829  0.864 0.825 0.846 0.840 
Observations 73  73  73  59  59 
For notes see Table 1. 
still there. This does not necessarily hold anymore when the indexes of judicial 
independence are included (equation (4) and (5)). De facto PI and de facto JI are 
only marginally significant in these specifications. For the smaller number of ob-
servations the interaction introduces too much noise in the estimated equations 
such that the efficiency of the estimation results is somewhat reduced. – 20 – 
Many more robustness checks not reported in tables have been carried out: the 
various legal origins do not perform significantly different from the group of 
Scandinavian countries used as a benchmark. This is somewhat surprising as those 
countries score well above-average in corruption rankings. Our result seems to 
suggest that it is their being protestant rather than having a specific legal tradition 
that causes low levels of corruption. Continent dummies do not show up as sig-
nificant either. Further, using quadratic terms for the de facto PI variable does not 
indicate that some countries might have chosen “too much” independence. All in 
all, de facto PI survives as a significant and highly robust variable explaining 
variation in perceived corruption levels. 
6 Conclusions and Open Questions 
The first value-added of this paper consists in presenting two new indicators re-
flecting the de jure as well as the de facto independence of prosecutors in up to 78 
countries. Here, these two new indicators have been used to inquire into the pos-
sible effects of prosecutorial independence on perceived corruption levels. 
Factually independent prosecutors lead to lower levels of perceived corruption. 
This result is quite robust across various specifications. Unexpectedly, formal 
prosecutorial independence is correlated with higher corruption levels although 
the coefficients never reach conventional significance levels. We argue that this 
finding reflects reversed causality: Due to gentle pressure to fight corruption, 
many governments have passed fresh legislation granting their prosecutors more 
independence formally. Yet, formal legislation often remains black letter law. 
Various other applications of the new indicators come to mind: First, it has al-
ready been mentioned that the procuracy is only one element in the value chain 
producing justice and security; the police and the courts are two other such ele-
ments. It could be of interest to delve a little deeper into possible interrelation-
ships between these three actors. 
It can further be analyzed whether different degrees of prosecutorial independence 
have effects on the perceived legitimacy of governments. Legitimacy could suffer 
if it is known that crimes are less likely to be prosecuted if committed by a mem-
ber of government. This could also undermine the trust of the population in gov-
ernment. Low levels of trust could, in turn, lead to a lower propensity to invest 
and thus to negative economic consequences. But low levels of trust might also 
decrease regime stability and lead to an increase in the resources that need to be 
spent on police forces etc. It could thus be tested whether low prosecutorial inde-
pendence is not only correlated with higher levels of corruption but also with (i) – 21 – 
lower regime legitimacy, (ii) lower trust in government, (iii) lower regime stabil-
ity and even (iv) lower economic growth. 
In this paper, we have mainly focused on prosecutorial independence. It was, 
however, mentioned that independence as such is not a sufficient condition but 
that prosecutors need also be accountable. It could be worthwhile to pursue this 
argument and analyze cases in which meritless cases have been pursued for what-
ever reasons. With regard to the judiciary, the danger of its becoming too eager 
has been discussed under the heading of ‘judicial activism’. In analogy, the danger 
mentioned here could be discussed under the heading of ‘prosecutorial activ-
ism’.12 
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Appendix 1: Text of the Questionnaire Combined With the Coding Used 
The role of state prosecutors and the separation of powers 
 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please return to: 
Prof. Dr. Stefan Voigt 
Economic Policy, Economics 






this research project is concerned with the systematic place that state prosecutors occupy in the 
separation of powers as implemented in various countries. It tries to identify the degree of inde-
pendence that state prosecutors enjoy in general and their independence in prosecuting crimes 
committed by members of government in particular. It complements a previous research project 
concerned with judicial independence. 
We would be grateful if you could help us with your knowledge concerning the country on 
which you are an expert. We would appreciate if you could (a) answer the following questions, 
and (b) could indicate good sources for additional information (primary as well as secondary). In 
some countries, prosecutors are called state attorneys, public attorneys etc. In order to keep 
things simple, we have decided to use the term “prosecutor” to describe the function and “procu-
racy” to describe the office no matter what the exact term in a given country. 
You will notice that we distinguish between high level prosecutors and other prosecutors. High 
level prosecutors are the state prosecutor, the general prosecutor or the attorney general. Other 
prosecutors are all those that are not high level prosecutors. 
If you are interested, we would be pleased to keep you informed on the progress concerning the 
indicator. In that case, please provide us with your address. Of course, the easiest way to return 
the questionnaire is by e-mail. The latest results regarding this research project will be put on 
our server: 
http://www.wirtschaft.uni-kassel/voigt/htm – 24 – 
Thank you very much for your help. Yours sincerely 
Stefan Voigt 
Country for which information is provided: 
_____________________________________ 
 
(1) Is the office of state prosecutor 
a  mentioned in the Constitution?    YES (1)13  NO ( ) 
b  mentioned in the Law?      YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
c  mentioned somewhere else? Namely _____________________. 
(It is possible to tick more than one answer.)(If more than one answer, the country 
gets the higher score). 
 
(2) Is the principle of mandatory prosecution 
a  mentioned in the Constitution?    YES (1)  NO ( ) 
b  mentioned in the Law?      YES (0,66)  NO ( ) 
c  mentioned in precedent/court decisions  YES (0,33)  NO ( ) 
d  not part of the legal system      YES (0)  NO ( ). 
(It is possible to tick more than one answer.)(If more than one answer, the country 
gets the score of the answer that is coded highet). 
 
(3) Please answer this question only if mandatory prosecution is the pertinent le-
gal principle in your country. 
Are exceptions – due to the opportunity principle – enumerated 
a  in the Constitution?        YES (1)  NO ( ) 
b  in the Law?          YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
c  in precedent/court decisions      YES (0)  NO ( ). 
                                                 
13   The numbers in parantheses are the codings used; these were NOT part of the questionnaire 
as sent to the country experts. – 25 – 
 
(4) Is the power to initiate court proceedings with regard to crimes 
a  confined to state prosecutors only?        (0,0) 
b  also  available  to  others       
i  namely  the  police?      (0,2) 
ii  directly  concerned  individuals?    (0,4) 
iii  others (such as associations), namely     
__________(if state agencies 0,2; if non-state agencies 0,4) 
(5) Please answer this question only if the power to initiate court proceedings is 
not confined to the state prosecutor. 
What is the percentage of cases that are initiated by other actors than the state 
prosecutors? 
a  Between 0 and 5% of all cases        (0,00) 
b  Between 6 and 10% of all cases        (0,25) 
c  Between 11 and 20% of all cases        (0,50) 
d  Between 21 and 40 % of all cases        (0,75) 
e  More than 40% of all cases          (1,000). 
 
(6) Do members of the executive have the power to give instructions to prosecu-
tors 
a  with regard to specific cases?      YES (0)  NO ( ) 
b  by issuing general guidelines?    YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
c  not at all?          YES (1)  NO ( ). 
 
(7) Does the head of the procuracy have the power to give instructions to prosecu-
tors 
a  with regard to specific cases?      YES (0)  NO ( ) 
b  by issuing general guidelines?    YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
c  not at all?          YES (1,0)  NO ( ). 
 
(8) Is there an impersonal rule which allocates incoming cases to specific prose-
cutors?      YES  (1)  NO  (0). 
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(9) Can an investigation be reallocated to another state prosecutor against the will 
of the hitherto investigating state prosecutor without due reason? 
YES (0)  NO (1). 
 
(10)  Are the possibilities for reallocation 







(11)  Does the state prosecutor officially have to inform the media about an 
ongoing investigation?      YES ( )  NO ( ). 
 
(12)  Please answer this question only if your answer to question (11) was 
yes. 
Does the state prosecutor have to inform the media 
a  before indictment?      YES ( )  NO ( ) 
b  after indictment?      YES ( )  NO ( ). 
 
(13)  Prosecutorial decisions are subject to review by the judiciary. Does the 
judiciary have the competence to 
a  review the charges brought 
by the prosecutor?      YES (0,25)  NO ( ) 
b  review the decision to 
prosecute a certain crime?    YES (0,25)  NO ( ) 
c  review the decision not to prosecute a 
certain crime due to legal or factual 
deficiencies?     YES  (0,5)  NO  (  ) 
d  review the use of the opportunity 
principle by the prosecutors?   YES ( )  NO ( ). 
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(14)  Are formal qualification prerequisites for being  
appointed as a prosecutor less 
demanding than those applying to judges?  YES (0)  NO (1). 
(15)  Are there special rules concerning the investigation and prosecution of 
politicians/ other public figures?    YES (0)  NO (1). 




(16)  Decisions to indict a public figure have to be authorized by 
a  the highest prosecutor?     YES (0)  NO ( ) 
b  any prosecutor?       YES (1)  NO ( ) 
c  especially appointed prosecutors?   YES (0)  NO ( ) 
d  others?      YES  (na)  NO  (  ). 
 
(17)  After finishing their term, high level prosecutors often enter 
a  Political office  (  ) 
b  Judicial office   (  ) 
c Other,  such  as____________________________________. 
 
(18)  How are high-level public prosecutors nominated/appointed/elected? 
a  High level prosecutors are nominated and appointed by one or more members 
of  the  executive;        (        ) 
b  High level prosecutors are nominated by one or more members of the execu-
tive and are elected by parliament (or a committee thereof);   (    ) 
c  High level prosecutors are nominated by one or more members of the execu-
tive and are elected by the judiciary;         (    ) 
d  High level prosecutors are nominated and elected by parliament (or a commit-
tee  thereof);          (        ) 
e  High level prosecutors are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) 
and are elected by one or more members of the executive;    (    ) 
f  High level prosecutors are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) 
and are elected by the judiciary;           (    ) – 28 – 
g  High level prosecutors are nominated and elected by the judiciary; (    ) 
h High level prosecutors are nominated by the judiciary and are ap-
pointed/elected by one or more members of the executive;   (    ) 
i  High level prosecutors are nominated by the judiciary and are elected by par-
liament (or a committee thereof);         (    ) 
j  High level prosecutors are nominated by the judiciary, the legislature, or the 
executive and are elected by actors not representing any government branch 
(academics, the public at large);           (    ) 
k  High level prosecutors are elected by general elections.     (    ) 





  Competence to elect/appoint high 
level prosecutors 
    Executive  Legislature  Judiciary  
Executive   0  1/3  2/3 





Judiciary  2/3  2/3  1 
 
 
(19)  Do high level prosecutors enjoy tenure 
a  for life or until retirement?        (1) 
b  for a fixed term of ___ years       (    ) 
 i  with  renewability?     (0) 
ii without  renewability?      (0,5) 
c  other, namely ________________________  (    ). 
 
(20)  Do low level prosecutors enjoy tenure 
a  for life or until retirement?        (1) 
b  for a fixed term of ___ years       (    ) 
 i  with  renewability?     (0) 
ii without  renewability?      (0,5) – 29 – 
c  other, namely ________________________  (    ). 
 
(21)  Do criminal law judges enjoy tenure 
a  for life or until retirement?        (1) 
b  for a fixed term of ___ years       (    ) 
 i  with  renewability?     (0) 
ii without  renewability?      (0,5) 
c  other, namely ________________________  (    ). 
 
(22)  In the decade from 1991 to 2000, approximately _________ prosecutors 
were forced to retire against their will. 
The answers were coded using the following table: 
Number of forced retirments Coding 
0  1,0 
1-2  0,8 
3-4  0,6 
5-6  0,4 
7-8  0,2 
more    0,0 
IF response was “a few”, the coding was 0,6 
 
Among the most important reasons for forced retirement were 
A  low popularity of prosecutors    (    ) 
B  that the prosecutors had committed criminal acts  (    ) 
C  that the prosecutors reached retirement age   (    ). 
 
(23)  Low level prosecutors can be promoted by 
a  high level prosecutors      YES (1)  NO ( ) 
b  the minister of justice     YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
c  other members of the executive  YES (0)  NO ( ). 
If a∧b = 0,75; if a∧c = 0,5; if b∧c =0,25 
(24)  High Level Prosecutors can be removed from office 
a  only by judicial procedure    YES (1)  NO ( ) 
b  by decision of one or more 
members of the executive    YES (0)  NO ( ) – 30 – 
c  by decision of parliament 
(or a committee thereof)    YES (0,33)  NO ( ) 
d  by joint decision of one or more 
members of the executive and of 
parliament (or a committee thereof)  YES (0,66)  NO ( ) 
e  other      YES  (na)  NO  (  ). 
If a∧b = 0,25; if a∧c = 0,5; if b∧c =0,33, if b∨c = 0. 
The reasons are (e.g. disciplinary offence):IF “change of government”= 0. 
 
(25)  Low Level Prosecutors can be removed from office 
a  only by judicial procedure    YES (1)  NO ( ) 
b  by decision of one or more 
members of the executive    YES (0,25)  NO ( ) 
c  by decision of parliament 
(or a committee thereof)    YES (0,5)  NO ( ) 
d  by joint decision of one or more 
members of the executive and of 
parliament (or a committee thereof)  YES (0,75)  NO ( ) 
e  other      YES  (na)  NO  (  ). 
The reasons are (e.g. disciplinary offence): 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
(26)  Can prosecutors be transferred against their will to 
a  another position?      YES (0)  NO (1) 
b  another  location?    YES  (0)  NO  (1). 
 
(27)  In the decade between 1991 and 2000, prosecutors have been removed 
against their will approximately _________________________ times. 
The answers were coded according to the key used for variable 22. 
(28)  Removal of state prosecutors is 
a  more  easy       (0) 
b  the  same       (0,5) – 31 – 
c  more  difficult       (1) 
than removing judges from office. 
 
(29)  Since 1960, the laws relevant for the prosecution of crimes committed 
by members of government have been changed 
a   0   t i m e s         ( 1 )  
b  1  or  2  times       (0,8) 
c  3  or  4  times       (0,6) 
d  5  or  6  times       (0,4) 
e  7  or  8  times       (0,2) 
f  more  than  8  times      (0,0). 
 
(30)  Since 1960, the income of prosecutors has remained at least constant in 
real  terms        YES  (1)  NO  (0). 
 
(31)  Since 1960, the budget of state prosecutorial offices has remained at 
least constant in real terms       YES (1)  NO (0). 
 
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING 




General comments (please feel free to make any comment): – 32 – 
Appendix 2: 























Mean 0.569  0.458  0.537  0.441  0.459  0.450  0.466  0.526 0.612 
Median 0.625  0.388  0.522  0.500  0.466  0.426  0.453  0.600 0.646 
Maximum 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.843  0.860  1.000 1.000 
Minimum 0.125 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.116 0.116  0.000 0.142 
Std.  Dev. 0.228  0.244  0.238  0.234 0.250 0.145 0.142  0.327 0.256 
Observati-
ons  79 79  79  79  79  79 79  77 76 
 
 


























GENERAL 1.000                   
PERSNARROW 0.088  1.000                 
PERSBROA 0.099  0.919 1.000               
FORMAL  0.619  0.277  0.236  1.000           
MONOPOLY 0.061 -0.065 -0.138  -0.057  1.000           
SMALL_TOTAL  0.630 0.398  0.297  0.713  0.453  1.000         
GRAND_TOT 0.652  0.367  0.315  0.717  0.445  0.992  1.000       
DE_FACTO -0.165 0.141  0.094  -0.285  0.032  -0.189 -0.214 1.000     
DEFACMOD -0.133 0.124  0.103  -0.287  0.004  -0.223  -0.240 0.965 1.000   
DEJURJI 0.201  -0.032  -0.015  0.232 0.002  0.099  0.111  0.114  0.121  1.000 
DEFACJI 0.031  0.084  0.114  -0.002 0.036  0.012  0.020  0.331  0.334  0.167 
 
Appendix 3: List of Variables Used (Definitions and Sources) 
 
AGE: 
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 – DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 und 1. 
ANTI CORRUPTION AGENCY: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has such an agency; source: Alan Doig (private communication) and Transparency International 
websight. 
AVELF: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) averaging five sources; source: La 
Porta (1999). – 33 – 
CHECKS75: 
Number of the factual vetoplayers in 1975; source: Beck et al. (2000) 
CHECKS95: 
Number of the factual vetoplayers in 1995; source: Beck et al. (2000) 
COLBRIT: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former U.K. colony, 0 otherwise, source: CIA (2005). 
CPI9806: 
Corruption Perceptions Index measuring perceptions of abuse of power by public officials. Average over 1998 – 2006. Index values between 
0 and 10, lower values meaning lower levels of corruption (recoded from the original version); source: Transparency International and 
Internet Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/). 
DE FACTO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Average of up to 9 variables on a scale from 0 (dependent) to 1 (completely independent); source: Feld and Voigt (2006) 
DE JURE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Average of up to 16 variables on a scale from 0 (dependent) to 1 (completely independent); source: Feld and Voigt (2006) 
FEDERAL: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise; source: Forum of Federations (2002): List of Federal 
Countries. 
GDPCAP90: 
Real per capita gross domestic product in 1990; source: Heston et al. (2001). 
LATABS: 
Rescaled variable for latitude, defined as the absolute value of LATITUDE divided by 90 and taking on values between 0 and 1; source: CIA 
(2005). 
LEGAL ORIGINS: 
Dummy variables for COMMON LAW, FRENCH, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN and SOCIALIST legal origin; source: La Porta et al. 
1998, CIA World Book of Facts. 
POLIV: 
Factually realized level of democracy with -10 = “perfect” autocracy and 10 = perfect democracy; source: Polity IV Dataset 
POPSIZE90: 
Absolute size of a country’s population in 1990; source:  
PRESSFREE: 
Freedom of the Press from 0 = completely free to 100 = unfree, source: Freedom House 
PROTESTANT: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based on their average from 
1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and  CIA (2005): 
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